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ABSTRACT
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has had a devastating and disproportionate
impact in countries of the Global South. The experience of an individual
infected with HIV in Africa is very different than that of an individual infected
with HIV in America. Life expectancy varies sharply. The ability or inability to
access medicines essential for treatment accounts for much of the variance.
This article examines how the rhetoric of human rights used in the context of
South Africa's AIDS crisis resonated across the Global South, resulted in a
powerful social movement for access to medicines, and contributed to
important changes in international intellectual property law principles. This
article first introduces the competing commitments governments of the Global
South face with a discussion of the current status of the global AIDS epidemic
and an explanation of the structure and content of the international
intellectual property and human rights legal systems. This article then
provides a discussion of how domestic civil society activists organized to oppose
international intellectual property interests through law and politics using the
language of international human rights. Next, it presents an interpretation of
how events in South Africa led to the Doha Declaration and strengthened the
emerging alliance between countries of the Global South. Finally, it identifies
lessons to be learned from the experience of these actors.
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INTRODUCTION
Human rights are understood to be universal. Everyone, everywhere
is entitled to enjoy the fundamental rights contained in international
legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights;
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the African
Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. Each of these instruments
recognizes health as a fundamental human right. International
institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have partnered to promote
public health. However, despite its recognition in international law and
its promotion by international institutions, the human right to health
remains unrealized for many.
The international AIDS pandemic has had an especially devastating
and disproportionate impact in the Global South.' Across all countries
the disease seems to affect or infect the most vulnerable people in a
population-women, children, and members of disfavored or
disadvantaged groups. The strong intersection between identity and
infection across countries and within societies implicates deep global
inequalities. For example, to be infected in South Africa is very different
than being infected in the United States of America; life expectancy
varies greatly, as does access to treatment. 2 One of the most difficult
public health challenges for certain countries in the Global South is
ensuring access to affordable treatment and medicines for people who
are HIV-positive.
While access to medicines is an essential component of the right to
health, globally almost two billion people lack access to essential
medicines.3 In December 2009, only thirty-six percent of people living
with HIV in low- and middle-income countries were receiving
treatment.4 Individuals who do not receive treatment early can become
resistant to first-line medications that treat HIV, requiring second-line
1. The term "Global South" is used in this instance to refer to developing nations in
portions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
2. Richard Hunt, HIV and Aids: Statistics, U.S.C. SCH. OF MED. MICROBIOLOGY &
IMMUNOLOGY ON-LINE, http://pathmicro.med.sc.edullecture/hiv5.htm.
3. U.N. Human Rights Council (H.R.C.), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, 11th Sess., 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (by Anand Grover) (citing
World Health Organization [WHO], WHO Medicines Strategy: Countries at the Core, 2004-
2007 (2004)).
4. WHO, Progress Report 2010: Towards Universal Access: Scaling Up Priority
HIV/AIDS Interventions in the Health Sector 53 (2010), available at
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/2010progressreport/report/en/index.html.
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treatments that can cost up to nine times as much as earlier treatment
options.5
In 1994, the international community, struggling to cope with an
emerging global pandemic, founded the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). That same year the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was also created. The WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) revolutionized
global patent law. Among other things, TRIPS countries are required to
standardize recognition of patents and to protect intellectual property
rights against infringement. After the TRIPS expansion of patent
protection to pharmaceutical products and processes, countries in the
Global South found their ability to promote public health compromised
by the prohibitively high cost of the patented drugs used to treat AIDS
and its associated opportunistic infections.6
A legal challenge brought against the government of South Africa by
pharmaceutical manufacturers to force the country to bring its laws into
compliance with TRIPS was met with significant resistance from civil
society.7 The suit and subsequent social unrest served to raise global
awareness of the potentially negative public health consequences of
strong patent protections in the context of a developing country
experiencing an epidemic disease burden. Resistance to TRIPS from
developing nations, primarily South Africa, India, and Brazil, at
international meetings of the WTO eventually led to the concessions
contained in the Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration provides that
the TRIPS agreement does not prohibit a member country from taking
measures to protect public health and to promote access to medicines.8
The Declaration also permits the use of compulsory licenses under
certain circumstances.9
This article will examine how the rhetoric of human rights used in
the context of South Africa's AIDS crisis resonated across the Global
5. "At the beginning of treatment, the combination of drugs that a person is given is
called first line therapy. If after a while HIV becomes resistant to this combination, or if
side effects are particularly bad, then a change to second line therapy is usually
recommended. Second line therapy will ideally include a minimum of three new drugs,
with at least one from a new class, in order to increase the likelihood of treatment
success." Introduction to HIV and AIDS Treatment, AVERT, http://www.avert.org
treatment.htm (scroll down to "first and second line therapy").
6. SAfAIDS, Unsung Heroes: WHO Breakthrough on Patents Will Give Poor Countries
Better Access to Drugs, 14 SAfAIDS NEWS 2, no. 2, 2008 at 10, http://www.safaids.net/
fles/ul/SAfAIDSNewsJune_2008.pdf.
7. William Flanagan & Gail Whiteman, 'AIDS is Not a Business'" A Study in Global
Corporate Responsibility-Securing Access to Low-Cost HIV Medications, 73 J. Bus.
ETHICS 65, 71 (2006).
8. World Trade Organization, The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 4, WTIMIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
9. Id. I 5(b).
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South, resulted in a powerful social movement for access to medicines,
and contributed to important changes in international intellectual
property law principles and international pharmaceutical industry
practices. Specifically, this article will explore the emergence and
efficacy of South Africa's political alliance with India and Brazil to
influence legal reform and increase access to medicines essential for
treating HIV/AIDS.
I argue that the social movement around access to medicines, as it
was organized and deployed in South Africa, has shaped positions of
governments and the scope of international law with respect to
intellectual property.' 0 South Africa's law and politics with respect to its
AIDS crisis has served as an exercise in making claims and articulating
obligations with lasting power to influence multiple systems of law. It
also has helped to build alliances among other countries in the Global
South, specifically India and Brazil. This article presents the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association v. The President of the
Republic of South Africa" lawsuit as an illustration of how norms are
being negotiated by countries, communities, and corporations within
and between different levels of domestic and international law. The case
also illustrates how multiple legal systems can work together or against
one another.
Part I of this article introduces the issues with a discussion of the
status of the global AIDS epidemic and an explanation of the structure
and content of the international intellectual property and human rights
legal systems. Part II provides a discussion of how domestic civil society
activists organized to oppose international intellectual property
interests through law and politics using the language of international
human rights. Part III presents an interpretation of how events in
South Africa led to the Doha Declaration and strengthened the
emerging alliance between South Africa, India, and Brazil. Finally, Part
IV identifies lessons to be learned from the experience of these actors
and interrogates the role of rights as weapons in what legal
anthropologists have termed "lawfare."12
10. See Susan K Sell & Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest
Between Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INT'L STUD. Q.
143, 166-67 (2004).
11. Pharm. Mfrs.' Ass'n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., Case no.
4183/98, High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division).
12. See John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An
Introduction, in LAw AND DISORDER IN THE PosTcOLoNY 1, 26-27 (John L. Comaroff &
Jean Comaroff eds., 2006). Lawfare has also been used in other contexts to describe the
use of law as a "weapon" in actual warfare. E.g., What is Lawfare?, THE LAWFARE
PROJECT, http://www.thelawfareproject.org/.
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Lessons to be drawn from the pharmaceutical industry's legal action
against South Africa and the opposition it drew from activists
domestically and internationally may enable us to better understand
the potential of power emanating from new places-corporations and
communities. While power asymmetry persists in the global system, the
conflict over the case also teaches that there are new areas in which to
promote human dignity through advancing human rights. This article
concludes that the agency of communities deploying rights language and
using the law in innovative and inventive ways across the Global South
is reason for optimism. By giving voice to viewpoints from the Global
South, communities have changed the conversation of the trade in
intellectual property to include recognition of rights.
I. THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Global AIDS Epidemic: Epicenter Experiences
According to UNAIDS, the global AIDS epidemic has been
stabilizing since 2000, but sub-Saharan Africa remains at the epicenter
of the epidemic.' 3 According to UNAIDS, sixty-seven percent of people
living in the world with HIV reside in sub-Saharan Africa, and seventy-
two percent of AIDS deaths occur in the region.14 In most regions
outside sub-Saharan Africa, men who have sex with men, sex workers,
and injecting drug-users are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS.15
In Africa, HIV prevalence is significantly higher among young women
than men.' 6 A disproportionate number of those infected and affected by
the AIDS epidemic in Africa are women,' 7 who account for nearly sixty
percent of HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa.18
UNAIDS attributes the stabilization in the global percentage of
people living with HIV to the positive effects of more widely available
antiretroviral therapy.' 9 Previously, people without access to
antiretroviral therapy were dying from AIDS. Now, people with access
to antiretroviral therapy are living longer with HIV. This was not
13. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 2008 Report on the
Global AIDS Epidemic, 5, UNAIDS/08.27E/JC1511E (July 2008) [hereinafter UNAIDS].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 22-23 ("Women account for two thirds of all caregivers for people living with
HIV in Africa, and women who are widowed as a result of HIV risk social ostracism or
destitution.").
18. Id. at 8 fig.6.
19. Id. at 5.
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always so. Indeed, antiretroviral therapy may not have been as widely
available as it is today had countries and communities in the Global
South not joined in alliance to advance arguments for greater access to
medicine. -
While there has been significant progress toward meeting the
challenges associated with the global AIDS epidemic, that progress has
been uneven. UNAIDS cautions that "the epidemic's future is still
uncertain, underscoring the need for intensified action to move towards
universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support."20
While the epidemic has stabilized, it has done so at high rates of
prevalence in some places. In 2007, the rate of HIV prevalence in South
Africa was an estimated eighteen percent among people aged fifteen to
forty-nine years.21
The percent coverage of antiretroviral therapy for adults and
children with advanced HIV, while improving significantly, is far from
universal and varies widely between nations for various reasons. For
example, Brazil enjoys greater than seventy-five percent coverage while
South Africa has only achieved between twenty-five percent and forty-
nine percent coverage. 22 Achieving universal treatment access by 2015
would reduce the number of projected AIDS orphans, estimated at
approximately five million, below current projections. 23
Nevertheless, according to UNAIDS the number of people receiving
antiretroviral medicines in low- and middle-income countries has
increased significantly.24 Antiretroviral therapy now reaches almost
three million people.25 Celebrating this expanding access in its most
recent report on the status of the global epidemic, UNAIDS
acknowledges that "[m]any actors share credit in this achievement,
most notably people living with HIV themselves, whose advocacy helped
achieve what was once considered impossible."26 Antiretroviral
treatment programs will remain critical for mitigating the epidemic's
impact. Because HIV treatment is for life, affordable and sustained
treatment programs will be essential over the long term. Ultimately, in
addition to preventing new infections, continued progress will require
securing more affordable HIV treatments.
20. Id. at 3.
21. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv. [USAID], HIV/AIDS HEALTH PROFILE SOUTHERN
AFRICA REGION 2 (2008).
22. UNAIDS, supra note 13, at 26 fig.29b.
23. Id. at 24 fig.28.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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B. International Intellectual Property Law
The protection of intellectual property is mandated by the WTO's
TRIPS Agreement.27 Established in 1995, the WTO is the multilateral
institution charged with administering trade rules among member
countries and is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).28 It serves as a forum for trade negotiations, resolves
trade disputes, monitors the national trade policies of its 153 member
countries, provides technical assistance and training for developing
countries, and cooperates with other international intergovernmental
organizations. 29
As successor to the GATT, the WTO emerged from a series of trade
negotiations, or rounds, conducted under the auspices of the GATT.s0
Countries participating in the Uruguay Round of GATT created the
WTO and in the process also achieved a major revision of the original
GATT.31 Established just after World War II, the GATT was widely
perceived to be ill-equipped to address the complexities of a modern
global market. 32
The original GATT primarily governed the trade of goods.33 The
Uruguay Round set forth new rules to govern trade in services, relevant
aspects of intellectual property and dispute settlements, and also
included trade policy reviews within its negotiated agreements.34 As
members of the WTO, countries receive assurances that their exports
will be treated fairly in foreign markets in exchange for their
commitment to extend fair treatment to imports into their own domestic
markets.35
Major decisions of the WTO are made by the entire membership and
by consensus. 36 A ministerial conference of the members convenes at
27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3.1, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
28. The WTO in Brief, WTO, http://www.wto.orglenglish/thewtoe/whatis-e/
inbriefe/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter WTO in Brie. For an
extended discussion of WTO history and structure, see WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO
(5th ed. 2010).
29. WTO in Brief, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. The GAYT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, http://www.wto.org/englishl
thewto_e/whatise/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
32. Id.
33. WTO in Brief, supra note 28.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Whose WTO Is It Anyway?, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis
.e/tifLe/orgle.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (explaining that, as during the GATT
regime, the WTO membership does not vote; rather, decisions are made by consensus).
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regular intervals to make decisions and is the highest authority within
the WTO system.37 The General Council manages the work of the WTO
between ministerial conferences, administering the operations of the
trade agreement, and ministerial decisions.38 Also composed of member
states, the General Council acts as the organization's dispute settlement
body, settling disputes between member countries.39 It also serves as
the WTO's trade policy review body, analyzing the trade policies of
member countries. Additional subsidiary bodies to the General Council
oversee specific areas of trade, including the Council for Trade in Goods;
the Council for Trade in Services; and the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council).40 These
subject-specific councils also have subsidiary committees. 41
During the Uruguay Round, developing countries negotiated some
flexibility in implementing their commitments under the WTO.42 Over
seventy-five percent of WTO members are developing or least-developed
countries. 43 Special provisions in certain WTO agreements recognize the
challenges developing countries confront and permit longer time periods
for such countries to implement agreements and commitments. 44 Also,
there are measures to encourage increased trading opportunities for
developing members,45 and all WTO members are obligated to respect
the trade interests of developing members.46
The WTO's intellectual property agreement, TRIPS, is a series of
rules governing trade and investment in various forms of intellectual
property. 47 Copyrights, patents, trademarks, and geographical names,
among other things, are protected under the accord. 48 In response to
widely varying standards of protection and minimal levels of
enforcement, 49 the TRIPS Agreement provides protection for intellectual
property by requiring member states to grant intellectual property
rights without discrimination against imported products.50 The TRIPS
Agreement also imposes a general obligation on its members to "ensure
that enforcement procedures . . . are available under [domestic] law so
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. WTO in Brief, supra note 28.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. TRIPS, supra note 27, recital para. 2(c).
50. Id. art. 3.1.
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as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights."5'
Under earlier international accords, a country was only obligated to
protect foreign intellectual property to the extent it protected local
intellectual property. 52 By integrating intellectual property right
governance into the WTO and by barring sector-based discrimination in
the granting of patents, TRIPS no longer permits members to select or
set different levels of protection.53 The TRIPS Agreement extended
patent protection into new areas that were previously unprotected in
several countries.54 With respect to patents, TRIPS imposes a twenty-
year period of patent protection on all inventions, whether of products
or processes, in most fields of technology with very few exceptions.55
Developed countries argued for integration of intellectual property
rights into the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, while many
developing countries opposed the integration of such rights into the
global trading regime. As James Gathii has observed:
Developed countries continue to maintain that high
levels of intellectual property protection provide the
necessary incentive for investment in research and
development, which is the best guarantee of access to
essential medicines for all countries. In contrast,
developing countries maintain that strict constructions
of the TRIPS agreement fail to recognize the legitimate
interests of intellectual property rights users, especially
in the context of crises such as HIV/AIDS.56
Ultimately, developed countries prevailed on the inclusion of
intellectual property and the establishment of a regime of protection,
51. Id. art. 41.1.
52. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 11, Mar. 20,
1883, 828 U.N.T.S 305 (requiring countries to protect certain forms of intellectual
property "in conformity with their domestic legislation").
53. See Kenneth C. Shadlen, Patents and Pills, Power and Procedure: The North-South
Politics of Public Health in the WTO, 39 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 76, 83 (2004).
54. Id.
55. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-ellegal e/ursume.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (stating the TRIPS
Agreement rule that inventions may be excluded from patentability if their commercial
exploitation is prohibited for reasons of public order or morality; other exclusions include
diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods, and for certain plants and animals and
biological processes for the production of plants or animals).
56. James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 291,
294 (2002).
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while developing countries secured the concession of "transition periods"
prior to their full implementation of TRIPS. Depending on the level of
economic development enjoyed, member countries labeled as "least
developed" were permitted longer periods of time to bring their domestic
laws, procedures, and policies into compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement. 57
Among the most important, and opposed, reforms introduced by the
TRIPS Agreement was its requirement that member countries grant
patents for pharmaceutical products.58 By bringing the governance of
intellectual property under the authority of the WTO, TRIPS compelled
countries to increase protection and treat pharmaceutical products the
same as other products. Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, many
developing countries did not grant patents to pharmaceutical products
(nor did many wealthier countries at earlier stages of development).59
Developing countries that did grant patents to medicines often did not
grant patent protection for the twenty-year minimum term required by
TRIPS.60
C. International Human Rights Law
Like the global agreements regulating trade, the international legal
regime protecting human rights also emerged after World War II. The
General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a common standard
of rights and freedoms for all, everywhere.61 Consistent with concepts of
rights gaining currency at the time, the UDHR contained a range of
substantive rights, including civil, political, socioeconomic, and cultural
rights. The UDHR was intended to serve as the foundation for an accord
that would be submitted to member countries of the United Nations for
ratification.
Ultimately, provisions of the UDHR were divided between two
treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
57. INFo. & MEDIA RELATIONS Div., WTO, FAcTs SHEET: TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS 7 (2006), http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-eltrips.eltripsfactsheet pharma
2006_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2011).
58. See TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 27.1 (stating that patents shall be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology, and whether products are imported or locally produced); see also Shadlen,
supra note 53, at 83.
59. See Shadlen, supra note 53, at 83-84.
60. Id.
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,1st
Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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(ICCPR)62 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).63 These two principal rights covenants
explain and expand upon the basic rights contained in the UDHR. The
two covenants establish monitoring bodies that review the regular
status reports made by member countries on the measures that their
governments have adopted and the progress made in realizing the
rights included in the covenants. These monitoring bodies also
periodically issue General Comments. These General Comments of the
treaty bodies provide further substantive content to the rights
enumerated in international human rights legal instruments by
outlining state obligations and offering normative explanations of the
entitlements associated with a given right.6 4
Some scholars from developing countries have challenged the
universality of human rights, noting that, from their inception,
international human rights legal instruments failed to include the
perspectives of non-European nations.65 It must be noted that much of
the Global South was under colonial rule at the time when both the
GATT and United Nations were founded and their respective global
rules on trade and human rights were formulated. United Nations
membership in 1948 included only fifty-six states.66 Further, some
scholars have argued that in certain cultural contexts, the perception of
rights may depart from the Western liberalism that underlies much of
the international legal regime of human rights.67 For example, many of
the rights in the international legal instruments can be read as
elevating the individual's interests over and above those of the
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52, U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 1966).
63. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
at 49, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jan. 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
64. See Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905, 908 (2009).
65. See, e.g., Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM 51 (Andras Sajo ed.,
2004).
66. HENRY J. STEINER, PHILLIP ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, PoIdTIcs, MORALS 135 (3d ed. 2008).
67. For examples, see the articles in the collection HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979) (investigating
the relevance of Western conceptions of human rights embodied in the UDHR in non-
Western societies); the articles in the collection HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992)
(discussing the cultural legitimacy of international standards of human rights); Jack
Donnelly, Human Rights and Western Liberalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 31 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990);
and Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, FOREIGN POL'Y, Autumn 1993, at 24,
25.
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community. Because individual liberties have been elevated over
communal interests in human rights discourse, discussions of rights can
be seen to have displaced discussion of responsibilities. In cultures
where emphasis is placed on obligations and duties to the community,
the pursuit of individual self-interest to the exclusion of others is not in
concert with cultural norms.
While the international legal instruments that comprise the
International Bill of Rights contain civil, political, and socioeconomic
rights, socioeconomic rights have met with greater resistance. For some,
socioeconomic rights are seen as the wrong sort of rights.68 Contrast, for
instance, the ease with which governments that censor speech or
imprison individuals without a fair trial can be identified as abusing
rights. On the other hand, it is not as easy to identify a victim, violator,
and remedy when an individual is illiterate or suffers from ill health. In
part, because socioeconomic rights have not fit the classic frame of what
a human rights violation is supposed to look like, they have not
traditionally received the same international attention that civil and
political rights have enjoyed historically.
International law, as well as the constitutions of many countries,
including those of South Africa, India, and Brazil, recognizes health as a
basic right.69 Article 25 of the UDHR recognizes a right to health,
68. Special Report: Righting Wrongs - Human Rights, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2001, at 18-
20 (arguing that "too many rights may well make a wrong'); see also Michael J. Dennis &
David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be
an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing,
and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 514 (2004) ("[Rlights and obligations contained in the
ICESCR were never intended to be susceptible to judicial or quasi-judicial determination.
The negotiator and drafters ... well understood the differences between [civil, political, and
socioeconomic rights] .. . . Those differences have not disappeared.").
69. The South African Constitution provides:
27(1): Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care
S. AFR. CONST.art. 27(1), 1996. The Indian Constitution provides:
47. Duty of the State to Raise the Level of Nutrition and the Standard of
Living and Improve Public Health
The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the
standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as
among its primary duties ....
INDIA CONST. art. 47. The Brazilian Constitution provides:
Article 196. Health is a right of all and a duty of the State and shall be
guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing
the risk of illness and other hazards and at the universal and equal
access of actions and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.
Constituigio Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 196 (Braz.).
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including "medical care and necessary social services."70 Expanding on
the content of the health right, Article 12 of the ICESCR proclaims the
right of everyone to "the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health."7 1 To meet their obligations to guarantee
this right, governments must, among other things, take steps to
prevent, treat, and control epidemic disease. 72 International law does
not limit the right to health only to healthcare services; rather, "the
right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that
promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends
to the underlying determinants of health . . . safe and healthy working
conditions, and a healthy environment."73 Accordingly, governments are
also responsible for creating the social conditions to make medical
service and attention accessible. 74
In recognition of the fact that many countries have limited resources
that may make government efforts to ensure the right to health for all
immediately virtually impossible, the ICESCR, unlike the ICCPR,
contains a provision permitting "progressive realization" of the health
right over an unspecified period of time.75 This qualification
notwithstanding, governments are legally obligated to "expeditiously
and effectively"76 advance the right to health by taking "deliberate,
concrete and targeted" measures to achieve its realization.77
The acts or omissions of a state may violate the health right. Under
international law, implementing laws that are patently irreconcilable
with enabling realization of the health right would constitute a
violation. Revoking laws essential to enabling the realization of the
right to health would similarly constitute a violation.78 Failure to devise
health policies or to enforce regulations tied to health or healthcare
would constitute omissions in violation of the right to health as well.79
In its General Comment, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR), the monitoring body for the ICESCR,
notes that while "the right to the highest attainable standard of health"
is not a right to be healthy, it does contain certain freedoms and
70. UDHR, supra note 61, art. 25.
71. ICESCR, supra note 63, art. 12.1.
72. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 44, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug.
11, 2000).
73. Id. t 4.
74. Id. 11 43-44.
75. Id. t 30.
76. Id. T 31.
77. Id. 30.
78. Id. TT 46-49.
79. Id. t 49.
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entitlements.ao People are free to control their bodily integrity and
remain free to refuse nonconsensual medical treatment and
experimentation. People are also entitled to enjoy certain social
determinants of health. The UNCESCR has interpreted the right to
health as requiring that governments take measures to ensure that the
social conditions are created to assure that appropriate healthcare is
available and accessible.81
In sum, if it is to be realized, the right to health under international
law requires performance and active intervention by the government
and other organs of society to improve the material and institutional
preconditions supporting the ability of an individual to obtain his or her
optimum health. Significantly, a violation of the right to health can also
occur when a government fails to regulate private nongovernmental
entities with the power to impede realization of the highest attainable
standard of health for others. 82
D. A Clash of Competing Commitments
While there are many factors in developing countries that may
influence the social determinants of the health of the country's
population, the failure to ensure access to essential medicines remains
at odds with obligations to respect, protect, and promote the human
right to health. Access to medicines also depends on many factors, not
the least of which is cost. The high cost of medicines is a significant
factor for many countries in the Global South that confront the
challenge of epidemic disease.
The exclusive monopoly that owners of intellectual property enjoy
for a period of time with respect to the manufacture, marketing, sale,
and distribution of the medicines they produce permits pharmaceutical
corporations to demand higher prices for their products. The high prices
of patent-protected pharmaceuticals place essential medicines beyond
the reach of many developing countries.83
The connection between the costs of essential medicines and the
international patent protections required by TRIPS was recognized and
raised by countries in the Global South, particularly since several were
80. Id. 8.
81. Id.
82. Id. 51.
83. Daniel Waniau Muriu, Third World Resistance to International Economic and
Structural Constraints: Assessing the Utility of the Right to Health in the Context of the
TRIPS Agreement, 11 INT'L COMM. L. REV. 409, 411 (2009).
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situated at the epicenter of the global AIDS epidemic. 84 It took civil
society activists in the Global South to frame the problem as one of a
denial of the fundamental human right to health, however, to bring
scrutiny to the international system of intellectual property protection.
These competing obligations to protect patents on pharmaceutical
products on one hand, and public health on the other, set the stage for a
clash of commitments in capitals across the Global South. Countries
now obligated to adhere to the TRIPS Agreement and respect
intellectual property, while protecting the human rights of their citizens
and others within their jurisdiction, confronted a challenge. Events in
South Africa brought into sharp relief this clash of competing
commitments to provide healthcare to AIDS patients and to protect the
property interests of the global pharmaceutical industry.8 5
84. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Third World Perspectives on Global Pharmaceutical
Access, in ETHICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 336 (Michael A. Santoro &
Thomas M. Gorrie eds., 2005); Anna Lanoszka, The Global Politics of Intellectual Property
Rights and Pharmaceutical Drug Politics in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L POL. Sol. REV.
181, 190 (2003).
85. Because the primary purpose of this article is to offer an account of how a social
movement and social impact litigation influenced the positions of government in the
Global South, a full discussion of the competing perspectives on patent protection,
innovation, and access is beyond the scope of this article. However, there is a growing
literature questioning the conventional wisdom that strong patent protection promotes
innovation and therefore access to medicines in the context of the Global South. See, e.g.,
E. Richard Gold et al., Are Patents Impeding Medical Care and Innovation?, PLOS MED.,
Jan. 5, 2010; Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1047, 1060 (2009) ("[Ilt is widely documented that patent rights do not promote research
into so-called 'neglected diseases' that primarily afflict poor countries that cannot afford to
pay a patent premium."); Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease
Innovations for Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 160 (2006)
(concluding that the "global burden of disease falls most heavily where the market is least
attractive"); Ann Weilbaecher, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to
Incentivize Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 283 (2009) (addressing the "inadequacy
of research and development for diseases that disproportionately affect people in
developing countries" and analyzing "how the patent system can inhibit innovation of new
drugs for neglected diseases"). Other commentators are considering alternatives to
promote innovation and increase access to medicines. See, e.g., J. Benjamin Bai et al.,
Transcript, From Infringement to Innovation: Counterfeiting and Enforcement in the
BRICS, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 525, 534-38 (2007) (reproducing the transcript of
Northwestern Professor Yi Qian's discussion of her recent work, which notes that the post-
TRIPS period has not stimulated innovation for diseases specific to developing countries
and proposes a patent system appropriate to develop levels and country-specific needs);
Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, PLOS
BIOLOGY, Feb. 17, 2004, at 147, 148 (noting the low rate of patents and research in
diseases afflicting the poor and suggesting an alternative mechanism to promote
innovation); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1090-1108
(2005) (describing equitable access licensing); Jed Odermatt, Investigating New Models of
Pharmaceutical Innovation to Protect the Human Right to Health (ELSA Selected Papers
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II. COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE ACTION: DOMESTIC RIGHTS LITIGATION
Having explained the clash between legal commitments to abide by
TRIPS and protect intellectual property rights and to create the social
conditions necessary for realization of the right to health, this part
presents the legal and political struggle in South Africa over access to
medicines as an example of actors in the Global South prevailing on the
point that intellectual property rights must yield to the right of a
country to protect its population.86
In 1997, under then-President Nelson Mandela, the South African
government enacted the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act No. 90, in significant part to protect the health of the
public by making essential medicines more affordable.87 To this end,
among other things, the Act empowered the country's Minister for
Health to determine whether to permit parallel imports of patented
drugs.88 The Act permitted the manufacture of generic HIV/AIDS drugs
and encouraged the promotion of generic alternatives by requiring
pharmacists to "inform all members of the public about the benefits of
the substitution for a branded medicine of an interchangeable multi-
source medicine."89 Price control measures were also permitted under
the Act, whereby a pricing committee appointed by the Minister of
Health would regulate a transparent system of published pricing.90
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa
(PMA), a coalition of the local subsidiaries of several major
multinational pharmaceutical corporations, brought suit in the High
Court in Pretoria challenging the South African government's
legislative efforts to increase access to medicine.9' PMA argued that the
government's proposed reforms in the Medicines Act would constitute a
on European Law, 2009), http://www.elsa.org/fileadmin/user-uploadlelsa-internationall
PDF/SPELISPELO9_JEDODERMATT.pdf.
86. In my view, the value of South Africa's struggle and the subsequent debates with
and within the Global South concerning access to medicines and international intellectual
property requirements have highlighted the competing obligations on countries, in which
legal obligations potentially in conflict with the right to health must coexist. Because both
the international intellectual property and human rights legal regimes are likely to
remain, ultimately any future compromises between these apparently competing legal
priorities must consider the needs of domestic populations burdened by disease.
87. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (S. Afr.).
88. Id. § 15C(b).
89. Id. § 22F(1)(a).
90. Id. § 22G.
91. Pharm. Mfrs.' Ass'n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., Case no.
4183/98, High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division).
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violation of their rights under the South African Constitution. 92 The
Association also argued that South Africa's statute was in breach of the
government's TRIPS Agreement obligations.93
Specifically, PMA complained that the Act would in effect enable
and authorize the Minister of Health "to deprive owners of intellectual
property in respect of pharmaceutical products . . . [and] alternatively to
expropriate such property without any provision for compensation to be
paid in respect thereof."94 The PMA principally advanced an equality
argument alleging that the Act was in conflict with South Africa's
constitutional guarantee of equality because it would permit the
government "to discriminate in favour of imported medicines to the
detriment of the manufacturers of local products."95 Further, the PMA
alleged that the Act "discriminates unfairly in favor of the
manufacturers of products qualifying as interchangeable multi-source
medicines of a prescribed medicine, and to the detriment of the
manufacturer of such prescribed medicine."96
South Africans living with HIV and AIDS opposed the industry
lawsuit, asserting that industry efforts to block legislation intended to
increase access to medicines would threaten their rights to health,
dignity, and life.97 The Treatment Action Campaign (TAG) became the
industry's principal opponent. TAC is a voluntary association of people
with HIV/AIDS and other allies, including their friends, families, and
healthcare providers. It also enjoys the support of trade unions,
churches, and international nongovernmental organizations. In early
2001, TAC organized an interfaith prayer service and march for
treatment access to increase public awareness of the PMA case and
condemn the pharmaceutical companies who were delaying
92. Henri E. Cauvin, Access to AIDS Drugs at Issue in South African Trial This Week,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001, at A7; see also Jennifer Joni, Access to Treatment for HIV/AIDS:
A Human Rights Issue in the Developing World, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 273, 276-77 (2002);
Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The 'Tourth Wave" of
Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 443 (2003).
93. Notice of Motion, Pharm. Mfrs.' Ass'n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S.
Afr., Case no. 4183/98, High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division),
available at http://cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html.
94. Id. 2.3.
95. Id. 3.2.
96. Id. 4.2.
97. David Barnard, In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 41238/98: The Global
Politics of Access to Low-Cost AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
159, 165 (2002); Nathan Geffen, Applying Human Rights to the HIV/AIDS Crisis, CARNEGIE
COUNCIL FOR Erics IN INr'L AFF., May 6, 2001, httpJ/www.carnegiewuncil.org/resources/
publications/dialogue/2Oflarticlest646.html.
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implementation of the Medicines Act through the litigation.98 The street
protests started by TAC against "profiteering pharmaceutical eimpires"
in South Africa eventually gained solidarity supporters around the
world.99
Over the objection of the PMA, TAC was granted leave from the
Pretoria High Court to be admitted to the lawsuit as amicus curiae in
2001. The papers filed by TAC in the case came to capture the country's
attention and redirect the public discourse on access to medicine. As
Mark Heywood, Head of the AIDS Law Project at University of
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa, observed at the time, the
TAC "amicus application functioned simultaneously as legal argument
and advocacy tool."100 With TAC's entry into the case, the litigation
became an organizing avenue for AIDS activists and quickly attracted
international media attention.
Like the PMA, TAC also framed its arguments in the language of
rights and urged the Court to consider "the rights to life, dignity and
access to health care services"10' as enshrined in the South African
Constitution and numerous international human rights agreements. 102
Like the UDHR, the South African Constitution includes civil and
political rights and social and economic rights in a single undivided
document. South African Constitutional Court decisions on
socioeconomic rights have affirmed that civil, political, and
socioeconomic rights are interrelated and mutually supporting.103 There
is a rich and growing literature by South African legal scholars and
other commentators on the substantive content of socioeconomic rights
in the country's constitution. 104
98. Treatment Action Campaign Application to be Admitted as Amicus Curiae, 1 10,
Pharm. Mfrs.'Ass'n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., Case no. 4183/98, High
Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division).
99. Id.
100. Mark Heywood, Debunking 'Conglomo -talk' A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as
an Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation, 5 LAw, DEmOcRACY & DEV.
133, 147 (2001).
101. See Heads of Argument on Behalf of the Treatment Action Campaign, 3.13,
Pharm. Mfrs.'Ass'n of S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., Case no. 4183/98, High
Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division), available at http://www.tac.org.zal
Documents/MedicineActCourtCase.htm [hereinafter TAC Heads of Argument].
102. Section 11 of the Constitution provides: "Everyone has the right to life." Section 10
of the Constitution provides: "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected." Section 27 of the Constitution provides that everyone
has the right to have access to healthcare services. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
103. See, e.g., Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, if 23-24 (2000)
(Constitutional Court of S. Afr.).
104. See, e.g., Mark Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Construction of
Socio-Economic Rights: A Response to Critics, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 617 (2004); Marius
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TAC argued that there were constitutional and international legal
obligations on the South African government to provide inexpensive
access to drugs, particularly in the context of the country's AIDS
crisis. 05 TAC dismissed industry arguments that special initiatives
were sufficient:
As for the initiatives by certain members of the PMA to
provide medicines at cheaper rates, these initiatives are
entirely at the whim of the manufacturers concerned
and reduce patients to the recipients of charity.
Initiatives of this sort can as easily be withdrawn as
they are made. Hence, powers of parallel importation
and generic substitution, as well as price control are
legitimate means to achieve price reduction and other
legitimate objectives.106
Like the PMA, TAC argued that the Court was bound to consider
international law in its determination. Unlike the PMA, which appealed
only to TRIPS provisions, TAC pointed to other international sources.
Specifically, TAC appealed to a variety of international human rights
instruments. Citing provisions pertinent to the rights to life, dignity,
and health in international instruments that South Africa had either
signed or ratified, such as the UDHR, the ICESCR, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, TAC argued:
In the context of a case such as the present, it is quite
clear that having regard to the nature and scale of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic there is a compelling case to be
made that the State is under a duty both under the
Constitution and at international law to ensure
adequate access to health care. 07
TAC defended the government's Medicines Act as an effort to meet
its binding legal obligations. TAC also defended the Medicines Act as
consistent with provisions of TRIPS that permit WTO members to
amend or enact laws, including measures necessary to protect public
Pieterse, Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights: Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care
Services, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 473 (2006); Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights
as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763 (2003).
105. TAC Heads of Argument, supra note 101, 1 1.2.2.
106. Id. 2.16.
107. Id. 3.39.
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health and promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
development.108
The PMA case came to be understood as a contest between the
"private interests of the pharmaceutical industry" and "people's lives
and public interest."109 Moreover, South Africa received considerable
support from advocacy and AIDS activists in the Global North.
Arguably, some of the sympathy for South Africa's position in the
litigation was due to the suffering and strength of South Africans seen
around the world.110 The further maintenance of a lawsuit against a
developing country, the gross domestic product of which would likely be
far below the combined annual profits of the corporations challenging it,
became untenable.
The Court never addressed the clash or conflict between the
competing rights asserted by the PMA and TAC because the
corporations involved elected to withdraw the lawsuit unconditionally.
The PMA's decision to withdraw its lawsuit left South Africa free to
implement its Medicines Act. Commentators have attributed the PMA's
decision to drop the suit to international public outrage.' When the
pharmaceutical industry dropped its lawsuit, its decision to do so was
seen as a defeat for efforts to expand intellectual property rights to the
exclusion of the experiences of AIDS patients and HIV-positive people
and their right to health. This early victory, credited to TAC's
intervention in the case,112 encouraged the emerging access to affordable
medicines movement to grow beyond South Africa's borders."is People in
the Global South put more pressure on their governments to push for
changes at the international level.
Although it never resulted in a judgment or a resolution between
the competing interests of private industry's intellectual property rights
108. Id.; see also TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 8 ("Members may, in formulating or
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement.").
109. See, e.g., Tshimanga Kongolo, Public Interest Versus the Pharmaceutical Industry's
Monopoly in South Africa, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 609, 610 (2001); Barnard, supra note
97, at 165.
110. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 481, 511 (2002).
111. See, e.g., Ellen F.M. 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to
Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond, in PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 206 (Sofia Gruskin et al. eds., 2005) (attributing the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers' Association's decision to drop the litigation to public outcry); Lanoszka,
supra note 84, at 192; Muriu, supra note 83, at 418.
112. Muriu, supra note 83, at 418.
113. Id.
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and the public international human right to health, the PMIA case was
instrumental in putting the access to medicines issue on the
international human rights and public health agendas. Events in South
Africa changed the plot from a tale of pirates engaged in the theft of
intellectual property to a story about the people and patients. The end of
the PNA case also marked a major turning point in the conflict over the
terms of the TRIPS Agreement.114
III. COUNTRY COALITION BUILDING: INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS
ARTICULATION AND INTERNAL POLITICS
The international access to medicines movement refrained the
debate on TRIPS as a system that privileged profits over people. The
HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa offered a perspective that challenged the
presentation of the TRIPS Agreement as merely a measure to protect
"private property from pirates."" 5 The PMA case, as well as the political
organization around the case, expanded the scope of the debate over
international intellectual property protection to include some
consideration of human rights claims.
Other international institutions outside the WTO entered the
conversation and expressed concern that intellectual property protection
for essential medicines could serve as an impediment to rights
realization.n6 The United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights
adopted a resolution on intellectual property outlining the implications
of patented pharmaceuticals for the enjoyment of the right to health."x7
The WHO also addressed the effects of strict, standardized international
intellectual property protection on access to medicines. The WHO
passed numerous resolutions on the importance of access to essential
114. Sell, supra note 110, at 511 (describing how street protests and pictures of "grim
televised images of dying mothers and babies" damaged perceptions of industry).
115. Muriu, supra note 83, at 419.
116. For a discussion of the global access to medicines campaign and interventions by
other international institutional actors, see id.
117. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Hum.
Rts., Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.chlHuridoedal
Huridoca.nsf/O/c462b62cf8a07bl3cl2569700046704e?Opendocument; see also ECOSOC,
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Hum. Rts., The Impact of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights
12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.cb/
HuridocdafHuridoca.nsflSymbol/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2001. 13.En?Opendocument (noting that
patent incentives inherently lead researchers "away from 'unprofitable' diseases," such as
those "that predominantly affect people in poorer countries"). For a discussion of the
resolution's history, see David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach to
Intellectual Property Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission
Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2003).
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medicines as an element of the right to health and the necessity of
permitting developing countries to take advantage of flexibilities
already available in the TRIPS Agreement to ensure affordability and
accessibility in the interests of public health."18 In June 2001, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a
report that found "evidence to suggest that the effect of patents on
affordability is significant with drug prices falling sharply when generic
substitutes enter a market or compete with drugs upon patent
expiry."" 9
A. The Doha Declaration
The PMA case and the momentum generated by the global
movement, combined with the inquiries by U.N. agencies into the
connection between intellectual property and public health, prompted
the TRIPS Council to call a special session in 2001.120 Talks at the
TRIPS Council eventually resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at the WTO's ministerial
meeting in Doha. Commonly called the Doha Declaration, the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is primarily a
product of an alliance of countries and communities in the Global South
and largely reflects the perspectives of developing countries.
The Declaration evolved from a discussion paper presented by the
Africa Group countries in cooperation with other countries in the Global
South.121 A coalition of civil society advocates from the public health,
development, and human rights communities joined the developing
country members of the WTO, led by the Africa Group along with India
and Brazil, to make the Doha Declaration possible.
It is worth noting, as Valbona Muzaka does, that the Doha
Declaration had "no precedents within the postwar trade regime during
the nearly 60 years of its existence, not to mention the strong symbolic
118. See, e.g., WHO, Exec. Bd., Antiretrovirals and Developing Countries: Report by the
Secretariat, EB 115/32 (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/
EB115/B115 32-en.pdf; World Health Assembly [WHA], Intellectual Property Rights,
Innovation and Public Health, WHA 56.27 (May 28, 2003), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdfLfiles/WHA56/ea56r27.pdf- WHO, Exec. Bd., Ensuring
Accessibility of Essential Medicines, EB 109.117 (Jan. 18, 2002), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdffiles/EB109/eebl09rl7.pdf; WHA, Revised Drug
Strategy Resolution, WHA 49.14 (1996).
119. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, T 43, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001).
120. Muriu, supra note 83, at 421.
121. Id.
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and real sense of legal and political victory it embodied for the
developing countries involved and their civil society allies." 122
The Doha Declaration now stands for the proposition that member
governments must implement and interpret the TRIPS Agreement in
such a way that it supports public health by promoting access to
existing medicines and the creation of new medicines. The Declaration
provides in pertinent part:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures to
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to
promote access to medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO
Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. 123
The Declaration lists the flexibilities to which member states are
entitled by right to exercise as follows:
Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses
and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
such licenses are granted. 124
Each Member has the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.125
122. Valbona Muzaka, Developing Countries and the Struggle on the Access to Medicines
Front: Viwtories Won and Lost, 30 THIRD WORLD Q. 1343, 1344 (2009).
123. Doha Declaration, supra note 8, 4.
124. Id. T 5(b) (emphasis added).
125. Id. T 5(c) (emphasis added).
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The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that
are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights
is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for
such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and
national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.126
Of particular note is the fact that the language of the Doha
Declaration is crafted in the language of rights. It speaks of the "right"
of members to grant compulsory licenses and the "freedom" of members
to determine what constitutes an emergency.
Without resolving the issue, the Doha Declaration also recognized
"that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in
the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use
of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement."127 The Council for
TRIPS was charged with finding "an expeditious solution to this
problem."128 A decision adopted in 2003 allows a waiver of WTO
member's obligations under TRIPS such that eligible members may
grant a compulsory license for pharmaceutical products for export to
eligible importing members, generally those least-developed members in
the Africa Group.129
B. The Trio and TRIPS
The agency exercised by activists in internal domestic politics is now
being played out in international arenas by countries of the Global
South. The coalition created in connection with the PMA case and the
Doha Declaration appears to have endured, and now the coalition's
scope has extended beyond the access to medicines issue. Cooperative
engagement between South Africa, India, and Brazil subsequent to the
Doha Declaration has led to the creation of a trilateral diplomatic
alliance actively challenging many of the perspectives and positions of
the industrialized world.130
Arguably, the internal politics of these emerging powers, with
population segments advancing human rights arguments, are informing
their international political agenda. In notable measure, this has
126. Id. I 5(d) (emphasis added).
127. Id. 1 6.
128. Id.
129. The WTO General Council formalized the 2003 decision in a resolution amending
TRIPS. WTO, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/trips e/wtl641_e.htm.
130. See Chris Alden & Marco Antonio Vieira, The New Diplomacy of the South: South
Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism, 26 THIRD WORLD Q. 1077 (2005).
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elevated rights concerns into arenas where human rights have not
previously enjoyed much prominence. As evidenced by the Doha
Declaration, developing countries in the Global South made demands
for rights in their negotiations, not requests for concessions. This new
ability to make demands is due in large measure to the increasing
influence certain emerging economies are able to exert when acting in
coalition.13
In 2003, South Africa, India, and Brazil signed the Declaration of
Brasilia, creating the IBSA Dialogue Forum (IBSA).1 32 These countries
created the IBSA for the purpose of sharing strategies to address
international issues of common concern to the countries and to promote
cooperation in international trade, areas of defense, multilateral
diplomacy, technology, social development, environmental issues, and to
foster greater South-South cooperation.
The Declaration creating the IBSA also structured the Trilateral
Commission, an internal institutional organization for the partnership
composed of the foreign ministers of the three countries. Thus, "[b]y
embedding the initiative within their respective foreign ministries," the
IBSA has "rapidly institutionalized a process that [might] otherwise fall
victim to the vagaries of changing political fortunes or individual
interest.""as The Trilateral Commission has continued to meet at regular
intervals.
Despite their apparent distinctions, the trio of countries shares
certain principles and priorities. The constitutions of all three countries
contain a right to health provision. All three countries were integrally
involved in the drafting of the Doha Declaration and the negotiations
that led to decision on the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration, which in particular concerns the needs of developing
countries without manufacturing capacity. All three have earned
positions on the U.S. Trade Representative's Section 301 List.134
131. See Andrew Hurrell & Amrita Narlikar, A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil
and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 20 GLOBAL SOC'Y 415, 417-22 (2006); Peter
K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED.
345, 349 (2008).
132. India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, Brasilia Declaration, June 6, 2003,
available at http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/index.php?option=com-content&view-article
&id=154&Itemid=86.
133. Alden & Vieira, supra note 130, at 1089.
134. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT
(2010). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the principal U.S. statute for identifying
foreign trade barriers due to inadequate intellectual property protection. Id. at 47. The
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act enhanced Section 301 with the inclusion of
requirements that the U.S. Trade Representative annually evaluate the intellectual
property policies and practices of foreign trading partners. Id. The USTR's annual Special
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Since the formation of IBSA, Brazil has won several concessions
from many major international pharmaceutical corporations with
threats to use compulsory licensing. After years of threatening to do so,
in 2007, Brazil issued compulsory licenses for the noncommercial public
use of the patented AIDS drug Efavirenz.135 The country's program to
provide free, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS has reduced
AIDS-related mortality by more than fifty percent and has saved
millions of dollars in treatment costs for AIDS-related infections.136
India manufactures "more than a fifth of the world's generic drugs"137
and has exported generic drugs to countries burdened by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. South Africa has imported generics from the other IBSA
members. Additional countries across the Global South are cooperating
in order to attain a greater ability to ensure access by increasing their
capabilities to conduct research, develop, produce, and distribute
medicines through the Technological Network on HIV/AIDS.38
IV. AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The influence that TAC and the IBSA trio will have on reshaping
international intellectual property and integrating human rights into
foreign policy agendas going forward remains to be seen. For example,
Daniel Wanjau Muriu argues that despite the advances of Doha, the
likelihood that the right to health could ensure better outcomes in
Africa is limited in light of the power and influences of competing
international economic actors. 39
While power asymmetry exists and likely will persist, the example
of the interplay between South Africa's civil society, multinational
301 Report identifies those countries where the level of intellectual property protection
does not sufficiently conform to U.S. standards. Id.
135. Yu, supra note 131, at 349; see also Thomas Eimer & Susanne Litz, Developmental
States, Civil Society, and Public Health: Patent Regulation for HIV/AIDS
Pharmaceuticals in India and Brazil, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 135 (2010); Matthew Flynn,
Public Production of Anti-Retroviral Medicines in Brazil, 1990-2007, 39 DEv. & CHANGE
513 (2008); Richard G. Parker, Civil Society, Political Mobilization, and the Impact of HIV
Scale-up on Health Systems in Brazil, 52 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES
S49 (2009).
136. Yu, supra note 131, at 349 (describing Brazil as a model for other developing
countries during the TRIPS talks; it was one of ten hardliner countries that refused to
expand the mandate of the GATT to cover substantive intellectual property issues).
137. Id. at 352.
138. Michael Westerhaus & Arachu Castro, How Do Intellectual Property Law and
International Trade Agreements Affect Access to Antiretroviral Therapy?, 3 PLoS MED.
1230, 1234 (2006).
139. Muriu, supra note 83, at 410.
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corporations, and the country's government over the AIDS crisis has
demonstrated that industry can be unwilling to risk the reproach of
consumers and citizens in the Global North. In the PMA case, industry
moved to redeem its standing by voluntarily ending the litigation and
offering to lower prices in response to the public relations crisis created
with AIDS patients and their allies who protested the industry's actions
in South Africa. Moreover, the expanding alliance between South Africa,
India, and Brazil indicates an increasing opportunity for integrating
rights concerns into global agreements that previously were more
limited in focus.
There is strong evidence that the resistance by TAC against the
PMA brought down the prices of antiretroviral medicines. The cost of a
triple therapy combination of antiretroviral drugs that cost the
equivalent of $450 dropped to $125 in South Africa.140 According to
USAID, the number of HIV-positive women receiving antiretroviral
therapy "increased from 76,000, at the end of 2004 to 251,400 at the end
of 2006."141 As a result, 47,700 infants were spared infection.142 In South
America, prices fell by fifty-four percent in fourteen countries. 43 The
dramatic drop in prices was due in part to "decisions by pharmaceutical
TNCs to cut down the prices of their patented medicines, and in some
cases to offer the medicines free of charge, following the bad publicity
they received in relation to the PMA case and from the global access to
medicines campaign."144 Price reductions during the period were also
attributed to increased competition from generic producers.145
Nevertheless, the substantive win at Doha remains difficult to
implement because of cumbersome and complex procedural
impediments. 146
While the success of social movement mobilization and the South-
South alliance is worth celebrating, without more, these movements
may not ensure a sustainable reconciliation between the rights of
pharmaceutical companies and the obligations of developing countries
with populations in need. Despite recent developments in the direction
of serving the interests of populations in need, some commentators
caution that strict, strong, and standardized patent protection will
140. Id. at 423.
141. USAID, supra note 21, at 7.
142. Id.
143. Muriu, supra note 83, at 423.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 426; see also Rohit Malpani & Mohga Kamal-Yanni, Patents Versus Patients:
Five Years After the Doha Declaration 19-20 (Oxfam Int'l, Briefing Paper, 2006), available
at http://www.oxfam.ca/sites/default/files/Doha5_Final%20paper101106.pdf.
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remain an impediment to access to medicines. 147 Indeed, the battle lines
have shifted. Industry and the coalition of developed countries that
support their position and that pressed for inclusion of intellectual
property into the WTO have moved away from the multilateral front of
TRIPS and are now emphasizing incorporation of intellectual property
into bilateral free trade agreements. Increasingly, developed cou'ntries
have in effect achieved even stronger intellectual property protection
than that contained in and contemplated by the TRIPS Agreement. In
addition, corporations continue to sue developing country governments
and are not ceding any ground. For example, in India, Novartis sued
over its intellectual property rights. 148 Eventually the case was
dismissed, but unlike the collection of pharmaceutical manufacturers
operating in South Africa, here the corporation never retreated from its
position and continued to press for protection of its intellectual property
rights. 149
The TRIPS Agreement contemplates a balance between inventors
and consumers. Article 7, which outlines the objectives of TRIPS,
provides:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to
the balance of rights and obligations.150
Emerging events in the Global South may prompt a different balance.
Where before the balance tipped heavily in favor of the interests of the
pharmaceutical industry, it is now counterbalanced by additional
factors framed as fundamental human rights.15 1
A frequently articulated objection to the more flexible access
strategies envisioned by the Doha Declaration offered on the part of the
pharmaceutical industry is that failure to provide strong protections for
intellectual property rights will ultimately result in less access.
147. Muriu, supra note 83, at 424.
148. See Linda L. Lee, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG
v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281 (2008).
149. Muzaka, supra note 122, at 1356-57.
150. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 7.
151. For a discussion of recent challenges to the international intellectual property legal
regime from various quarters, see Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 27-52 (2004).
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Advocates of strong patent protection for pharmaceuticals argue that
aggressive patent enforcement provides the incentive for industry to
invest time and capital in the research and development that leads to
innovation. To the extent that industry fears it will not be able to
recover costs, it will not undertake research and it will not enter
developing country markets. Under this view, the actions of the South
Africa, India, and Brazil alliance to advance public health through
increasing access using the allowed flexibilities would serve as a
disincentive for future innovation.
From a public health and human rights perspective, failure to use
the flexible strategies to increase access could constitute a dereliction of
sovereign duty. Offering an answer to the patent as innovation engine
paradigm is beyond the scope of this article; however, other
commentators have noted that the assumptions underlying
justifications for strong patent protection have not been sufficiently
examined empirically. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have observed that
"positions about the patent system's merits or demerits" are taken as
"articles of faith" absent "hard evidence." 52 Impediments to empirical
research remain because evidence is difficult to obtain. As William
Fisher and Talha Syed have explained, understanding innovation
incentives and assessing risks that industry will stop innovating absent
high profit returns on investments in research and development
requires the very information that "firms jealously guard." 153
Nevertheless, the introduction of a human rights discourse has served
to change the dialogue and will influence incentives going forward.
Perhaps, as Debora Halbert has argued, "a language of humanitarian
care that does not necessarily reject completely the idea of intellectual
property"154 will continue to emerge and make possible another path.
To the extent that the international law of intellectual property and
human rights seeks standardization and sameness, perspectives from
the Global South suggest that difference makes a difference. For
example, with respect to bringing a different perspective to a problem,
Mark Heywood writes that members of the TAC sought "to promote the
idea that commodities such as medicines, that are essential for health,
should be treated differently under patent law [than] commodities that
do not have any intrinsic link to human dignity and well-being."15 5
152. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
RESOLVE IT 37-38 (2009).
153. William W. Fisher & Tatha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs
for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 669 (2007).
154. Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa's Intellectual Property Fight for
Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 286 (2002).
155. Heywood, supra note 100, at 156.
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This rebalancing has contributed to greater access and a
stabilization of the epidemic. It may prompt further exploration of not
just rights, but also responsibilities. What are the responsibilities of the
international pharmaceutical industry in the context of a global
epidemic disease that disproportionately affects people in poorer
countries?
The lesson to be drawn from the South African experience and the
Global South alliance of South Africa, India, and Brazil is that there is
significant work that legal rights and political cooperation can do to
improve the conditions of people living in the Global South. The
response to resistance to aspects of the TRIPS Agreement from the
Global South also teaches that the struggle will be a sustained one.
John and Jean Comaroff lament the phenomenon termed "lawfare-
the resort to legal instruments" whereby:
Conflicts once joined in parliaments, by means of street
protests, mass demonstrations and media campaigns,
through labor strikes, boycotts, blockades and other
instruments of assertion, tend more and more-if not
only, or in just the same way everywhere-to find their
way to the judiciary.156
In this instance, the PMA case provides an interesting case in point
concerning the phenomenon of lawfare and its ability to escalate and
expand.
The great risk is that anyone can wield rights as weapons. In the
PMA case and its associated political events, human rights prevailed
over property interests by way of having more of a moral claim and a
virtual monopoly of misery associated with the AIDS crisis.
Communities affected by AIDS were devastated but not defeated, and
their courage compelled the industry to voluntarily abandon its
assertion of property rights in the South African courts. Rights are a
double-edged sword and can be wielded by both developed and
developing countries. Ironically, in the PMA case it was industry that
struck the first blow, asserting its right to equality under the South
African Constitution had been violated by the government then headed
by Nelson Mandela, a man who spent a significant portion of his life
imprisoned by an Apartheid government that rejected his calls for
equality.
156. Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 12, at 26-27.
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CONCLUSION
The manner in which the TAC, a South African civil society
movement, advanced legal arguments on the right to health in
opposition to a suit brought by the international pharmaceutical
industry against the South African government catalyzed an
international movement across the Global South that culminated in the
adoption of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. While its
implementation will remain a challenge, the success of incorporating a
substantive statement of rights into a trade agreement is a strong
normative foundation upon which to build further protection for the
right to health.

